Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 10 by Martin Feldstein & Daniel Feenberg
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 10
Volume Author/Editor: James M. Poterba, editor
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-16161-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/pote96-1
Conference Date: November 7, 1995
Publication Date: January 1996
Chapter Title: The Effect of Increased Tax Rates on Taxable Income
and Economic Efficiency: A Preliminary Analysis of the 1993 Tax
Rate Increases
Chapter Author: Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10900
Chapter pages in book: (p. 89 - 118)THE EFFECT OF INCREASED




THE 1993 TAX RATE
INCREASES
Martin Feldstein




The 1993 tax legislation raised marginal tax rates from 31 to 36 percent on
taxable incomes between $140,000 and $250,000 and to 39.6 percent on
incomes above $250,000. This paper uses recently published Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) data on taxable incomes by adjusted gross income (AGI)
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class to analyze how the 1993 tax rate increases affected taxable income,
tax revenue, and economic efficiency. Our estimates are based on a
difference-in-difference procedure that compares the growth of taxable
incomes among taxpayers with ACTs over $200,000 with that of incomes
of lower income taxpayers. We use the NBER TAXSIM model to adjust for
interyear differences in the composition of the two taxpayer groups.
The results show that high-income taxpayers would have reported 7.8
percent more taxable income in 1993 than they did if their tax rates had
not increased. Because of the high threshold for the increase in tax rates,
this decline in taxable income caused the Treasury to lose more than half
of the extra revenue that would have been collected if taxpayers had not
changed their behavior.
The deadweight loss caused by the higher marginal tax rates (includ-
ing the effects on labor supply and on consumption of goods and ser-
vices favored by deductions and exclusions) is approximately twice as
large as the $8 billion in revenue raised by the 1993 tax rate.
Several possible statistical biases could cause the estimated effect of
the tax changes to either underestimate or overestimate the true long-
run effect. The paper concludes with a discussion of these problems and
of plans for future analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although several studies have shown that lowering income tax rates in
the 1980s raised taxable income and labor supply,1 there are no studies of
the effects of increases in marginal tax rates. The present paper fills that
gap by analyzing taxpayer behavior after the 1993 increase in personal tax
rates using data from 1993 tax returns recently released by the Treasury.2
The sensitivity of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates is
obviously important because it determines the effect of tax rate changes
on revenue. Less obvious, the deadweight loss that results from a
1Lindsey (1987), Fissa (1996), and Navratil (1995) studied the effect of the 1981 tax rate
reductions on taxable income and on the labor supply of married women. Feenberg and
Poterba (1993), Auten and Carroll (1994a), Eissa (1995), Feldstein (1995a,b), and Navratil
(1995) studied the effects of the 1986 tax rate reductions. The actual panel data used by
Auten and Carroll (1994a) and Feldstein (1995a) show that despite the inherent problems
with the synthetic panels used in other studies, the results of those studies are very much
in line with the more accurate panel data. See also Auerbach (1994, 1995) for evidence on
the tendency of official revenue forecasts to overstate actual revenue because of taxpayer
responses.
2The earlier draft of this paper that was distributed to conference participants was based
on the preliminary IRS tax statistics for 1993 (Cruciano, 1995), whereas the current version
uses the final IRS statistics for 1993.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases91
change in marginal tax rates is proportional to the compensated elasticity
of taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate.3 For both reasons, it
is important to estimate the effect of tax rate changes on taxable income.
In this paper, we report the results of a preliminary analysis of the
effects of the 1993 tax rate increases. The analysis is consistent with the
basic finding of the previous studies of the tax rate decreases of the 1980s
that taxable income is quite sensitive to marginal tax rates. Our estimates
imply that the rise in marginal tax rates in 1993 led to a substantial
decline in taxable income. As a result of this sensitivity, the 1993 tax rate
increases raised less than one half of the revenue that would have been
raised with no behavioral response.4'5
Moreover, the compensated elasticity of taxable income with respect
to the net of tax rate (i.e., 1 minus the marginal tax rate) that we estimate
on the basis of the 1993 behavior implies that the deadweight loss associ-
ated with the 1993 tax rate increases is nearly twice as large as the net
revenue raised by those rate increases. This means that for every dollar
of additional revenue collected by the government as a result of the
higher tax rates, taxpayers experience a decline in their well-being
equivalent to $3 as a result of the induced changes in work, in the form
of compensation, and in tax deductible expenditures.
Section 2 of this paper reviews the nature of the 1993 tax increases and
the ways in which the resulting income and substitution effects could
affect representative taxpayers. Section 3 discusses the data and method
See Feldstein (1995c) for a demonstration that the overall deadweight loss of the income
tax that results from distortions in labor supply, in tax deductible expenditures, and in the
form of compensation is proportional to the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the
net of tax rate (i.e., 1 minus the marginal tax rate).
Feldstein and Feenberg (1993) analyzed the proposed 1993 tax rate increases and esti-
mated that taxpayer responses might cut the projected revenue by about 50 percent if
taxpayers responded to the higher marginal tax rates by reducing their taxable incomes by
5 percent. That analysis used TAXSIM data on individual tax returns (for 1989 adjusted to
1993 levels) but did not have actual taxpayer experience on which to base the estimated
response of taxable income. Feldstein (1995a) showed that an elasticity of one of taxable
income with respect to the net of tax rate would eliminate virtually all of the projected tax
revenue.
In the language of Washington tax policy analysis, the actual revenue effect of the tax rate
increases was less than one half of the "static" forecast. The U.S. Treasury Department's
revenue estimate was not strictly a static forecast but assumed that behavioral changes
would reduce 1993 personal income tax revenue by 7 percent as taxpayers responded to
the higher marginal tax rates by changes in realized capital gains, in the use of tax-exempt
bonds, in shifts from subchapter S to subchapter C corporations, and in various forms of
noncompliance and tax sheltering (Auten and Carroll, 1994). The method used by the
Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation of the Congress explicitly ignores changes
in labor supply, in the form of compensation, and in a variety of deductions (Auten and
Carroll, 1994; Feldstein, 1994).92Feldstein & Feenberg
used in the current analysis. Section 4 describes our estimated taxpayer
responses and the implied net revenue effects of the 1993 tax rate in-
creases. In Section 5 we present the implied elasticities. Section 6 reports
the associated deadweight losses of the tax rate increases. Section 7
applies the estimated elasticities to calculate the effect of eliminating the
ceiling on the health insurance payroll tax base that began in January
1994. Section 8 discusses possible biases in our estimate of taxpayer
responses, including the relation between the observed short-term ef-
fects and the likely longer term effects. Finally, Section 9 summarizes
conclusions and caveats and points to the direction for future research.
2. THE 1993 TAX RATE INCREASES
The tax legislation enacted in 1993 raised the marginal tax rate from 31 to
36 percent on taxable incomes between $140,000 and $250,000 (between
$115,000 and $250,000 for single taxpayers) and to 39.6 percent on tax-
able income in excess of $250,000.6 In addition, the legislation eliminated
the $135,000 ceiling on the Medicare component of the payroll tax, effec-
tively adding an additional 2.9 percent combined employeremployee
tax on the compensation component of taxable income. Because this
Hospital Insurance (HI) payroll tax did not come into effect until January
1994, we ignore it in our calculations. To the extent that high-income
taxpayers recognized that their marginal tax rates would rise in 1994 and
responded by shifting compensation to 1993, the observed reduction in
taxable income in 1993 is smaller than it would otherwise be, and we
underestimate the longer run loss of tax revenue and the implied sensi-
tivity of taxes to the net of tax rate. We can, however, use our estimates
of the sensitivity of taxable income to tax rates to estimate the effect of
the higher HI tax base. We return to do this in Section 57
Because the marginal tax rate applies only to incomes over a very high
threshold, for most of the high-income taxpayers there is a substantial
increase in the marginal tax rate but little increase in the average tax rate
6Because of the loss of 3 percent of itemized deductions at high-income levels, the effec-
tive marginal tax rates are about 1 percent higher than the statutory 31, 36, and 39.6
percent rates that we use in our calculations. We ignore this in our calculations.
The 1993 legislation also increased the tax rate for the alternative minimum tax (AMT)
and changed the AMT rules to broaden its base. Since the AMT only collects an incremen-
tal $1.1 billion, or 0.8 percent of tax revenue, among the high-income taxpayers whom we
study, we ignore it in our analysis. To the extent that some taxpayers became subject to the
AMT as a result of the 1993 legislation, they would have experienced a decline in their
marginal tax rate and may have responded by increasing their taxable income. Since we do
not take the AMT into account explicitly in our analysis, such behavior would cause us to
underestimate the effect of higher marginal tax rates on taxpayer behavior.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases93
on their initial ("no behavioral response") income. The structure of the
tax rate increase therefore has the likely effect of reducing taxable in-
come for many taxpayers to such an extent that the revenue with the
higher marginal tax rates is very much smaller than the traditional
"static" (no behavioral response) estimates would imply.8
An analysis of two representative high-income taxpayers shows how
this would occur in practice. Consider first a couple with $180,000 of
taxable income, the level of income that the Clinton administration identi-
fied as the median income among those taxpayers whose tax rates were
increased in the 1993 legislation. With no behavioral response, the in-
crease in the marginal tax rate from 0.31 to 0.36 on taxable income be-
tween $140,000 and $180,000 would raise additional revenue of $2,000.
However, the tax rate increase reduces the net of tax share that the tax-
payer receives from 0.69 to 0.64, a decrease of 7.2 percent. If this decrease
in the net of tax share causes taxable income to decline by 5 percent,9
taxable income falls from $180,000 to $171,000. This reduces the personal
income tax revenue by 31 percent of the $9,000 decline in taxable income,
a revenue decrease of $2,790. The combination of this revenue loss and of
the additional $1,550 collected by levying a 5 percent tax on the $31,000 of
taxable income (the difference between $171,000 of taxable income and
the threshold of $140,000 for the higher tax rate) causes the income tax
liability of this couple to decline by $1,240 as a result of the tax change.
There may also be a loss of Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) and Hospital Insurance (HI) payroll tax revenue. For example, if
the $180,000 of taxable income reflected the husband's wage income of
$130,000 and the wife's wage of $50,000 (plus investment income equal to
itemized deductions and other adjustments), the decline in taxable in-
come could reduce the HI tax revenue at a 2.9 percent rate if part of the
decline is due to a reduction in the husband's taxable compensation and
could reduce the OASDI and HI revenue at a 15.3 percent rate if part of the
decline in taxable income is due to a reduction in the wife's compensation.
Our analysis assumes that the compensation of the husband and the
compensation of the wife both decline in the same proportion as overall
taxable income.10 Reducing the husband's wage income by 5 percent of
8We emphasized this in Feldstein and Feenberg (1993) and Feldstein (1995a).
A 5 percent decline of taxable income in response to the 7.2 percent decline in the net of
tax share is roughly in line with the evidence presented in this paper and less than the
decline implied by the evidence presented by Auten and Carroll (1994a), Lindsey (1987),
and Feldstein (1995a).
° See Feldstein and Feenberg (1995) for our method of distributing total wage and salary
income between husbands and wives. We also include adding 50 percent of business and
professional income (schedule C income) to the husband's taxable compensation.94Feldstein & Feenberg
$130,000 implies a loss of HI tax revenue of $188. Reducing the wife's
wage income by 5 percent of $50,000 implies a loss of OASDI and HI tax
revenue of $382. The total revenue loss caused by the higher personal tax
rate is thus the sum of the lost personal tax revenue ($1,240) and the loss of
the payroll tax revenue ($570), for a total revenue loss of $1,810.
The revenue effect of the increase in 1993 tax rates becomes positive at
higher levels of taxable income. Consider the effect on a couple with
taxable income of $500,000, including $300,000 of taxable compensation
of the husband and $50,000 of taxable compensation of the wife. Their
marginal tax rate rises from 0.31 to 0.396, reducing the net of tax share
from 0.69 to 0.604, a decline of 12.7 percent. Assume that this induces a
decline in taxable income of 8 percent, from $500,000 to $460,000.11 The
net effect on personal income tax revenue is therefore an additional 5
percent tax on the income between $140,000 and $250,000 (a tax increase
of $5,500), an additional 8.6 percent on the income between $250,000
and $460,000 (a tax increase of $18,060), and a loss of revenue at the
initial 31 percent on the reduced $40,000 (a tax decrease of $12,400); the
net effect is therefore a net personal income tax rise of $11,160. The
offsetting loss of payroll tax revenue is small, since the decline in the
husband's wage and salary income is all in the untaxed range above
$135,000. The 8 percent decline in the wife's wage income from $50,000
causes a $612 loss of payroll tax revenue, bringing the goveinment's
overall net revenue gain to $10,518. For comparison, the static revenue
estimate based on the assumption that taxable income would remain at
$500,000 would be $27,000. The actual revenue gain for this couple is
thus only slightly more than one third of the static estimate.
We had planned to study the actual effects of the 1993 tax changes as
soon as the Treasury Department's panel data for 1993 became available,
using the method applied to the 1986 data in Feldstein (1995a). We were
struck, however, by an article in the New York Times that appeared on
April 17, 1995 with the headline "Well-to-Do Paid 16% More in Taxes in
'93, Study Says."
The story reported that "The taxes of well-to-do Americans surged 16
percent in 1993, the first year of revisions pressed into law by President
Clinton. People who earned $100,000 or more owed the Government $31
billion more, compared with their tax bills in 1992 according to computer
assisted analysis of IRS data by the Associated Press. Everyone else
owed about $3 billion more."
It was not clear to us why the analysis included the more than 3
million taxpayers with incomes between $100,000 and $200,000 of AGIs,
1See footnote 9 about the plausibility of this magnitude of response.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases95
since few of them would have been affected by the increase in marginal
tax rates on taxable incomes over $140,000. In contrast, the average
taxable income among taxpayers with AGIs of $200,000 is slightly more
than $140,000. Among the fewer than 1 million taxpayers with AGIs over
$200,000, 98 percent were affected by the increase in tax rates, whereas
only 9.5 percent of taxpayers with AGIs between $100,000 and $200,000
were affected. We suspected, moreover, that thegeneral rise in the taxes
paid by households with incomes over $100,000 reflected the rise in
nominal incomes and the shift of taxpayers who were not affected by the
1993 tax rate increases into higher tax brackets.
The study reported in the New York Times was widely noted as evi-
dence that the 1993 tax rates had raised substantial revenue at the top
and that the direct revenue effect of higher marginal tax rates had not
been offset by reductions in taxable income. Since the individual tax-
payer panel data would not be available for several years, we decided to
investigate the available aggregate evidence in more detail.
3. THE DATA AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Our analysis uses the Treasury Department's recently published tabula-
tions based on the individual income tax returns for 1993. These tabula-
tions provide information on taxable income and other tax return items
classified by AGI class. We focus our analysis on taxpayers with an AGI
greater than $200,000 and ask how this group, which we refer to as high-
income taxpayers, responded to the 1993 tax changes.
Since we do not have data for the same individual taxpayers in 1992
and 1993, we cannot examine how the actual taxable incomes of the 1992
high-income taxpayers changed between those two years. We can, how-
ever, estimate how adjusted taxable income changed for the highest
income taxpayers as a group between 1992 and 1993.12 We compare the
observed change in the taxable incomes of these high-income taxpayers
with our estimate of what that change would have been if they had not
modified their taxable income in response to the rise intax rates.
We base this estimate of their no-behavioral-response 1993 taxable
incomes on the behavior of taxpayers with AGIs between $50,000 and
$200,000.13 In effect, we assume that the relative distribution of income
would have remained the same (with all taxpayers subject to a common
12This is essentially the method used by Lindsey (1987).
About 93 percent of high-income taxpayers were subject to marginal tax rates of 36 or
39.6 percent; in contrast, only 2 percent of taxpayers with AGIs of $50,000 to $200,000 were
taxed at these high rates. These figures are based on our analysis of the Treasury Depart-
ment's 1991 Public Use Sample of tax returns adjusted to 1993 levels.96Feldstein & Feenberg
percent rise) and attribute the difference from this benchmark to the tax
change. 14
Because the tax rate increases did not apply to capital gains (recall that
the tax on capital gains remained at a maximum of 28 percent), we look at
taxable income excluding capital gains taxed at 28 percent. We also adjust
the measure of taxable income by adding back in the personal exemptions
and standard deductions because their values changed between 1992 and
1993.15 We call the resulting figure adjusted taxable income (ATI).
Our estimate of what ATIs would have been in 1993 among high-
income taxpayers if there had been no change in behavior is derived
with the help of the NBER TAXSIM model, using individual tax returns
for 1991, the most recent year for which such data are available. These
data are a stratified random sample of more than 100,000 tax returns
selected by the IRS to overweight high-income returns. We begin by
"aging" these data to 1992 in a way that causes the ATI among 1992 high-
income taxpayers to match the published amount. 16 This sample of syn-
thetic 1992 individual tax returns is then used to derive a baseline sample
of 1993 high-income tax returns corresponding to the 1992 tax rules (or,
equivalently, to the assumption that adoption of the 1993 tax rules did
not change taxpayer behavior).
The key to deriving this synthetic sample of no-behavioral-response
1993 high-income tax returns is to assume that the taxable incomes of the
high-income taxpayers would increase at the same rate as the taxable
incomes of those with AGIs between $50,000 and $200,000, since their
tax rates did not change in 1993.17 The published statistics for 1993 mdi-
14 If anything, the tendency for higher incomes to grow more rapidly than lower incomes
(see, e.g., the trend in the data presented in Feenberg and Poterba, 1993) suggests that our
method underestimates the no-behavioral-response level of 1993 incomes of high-income
taxpayers and therefore underestimates the depressing effect of high marginal tax rates.
Other factors may have influenced the groups' incomes in different ways. This could
cause our estimate to overstate or understate the true elasticity. We return to these possible
sources of bias later in Section 7.
15 The personal exemptions and standard deduction are extremely small as a proportion of
income for the high-income group. The standard deduction was only $300 million for this
group in 1993, less than one tenth of 1 percent of taxable income. Personal exemptions
were about one billion or less than one half of 1 percent of taxable income.
16 In the earlier draft of this paper, prepared for the Tax Policy and the Economy Conference,
we used the "preliminary" totals for 1993. In the current paper, we are able to use the
published "final" totals.
17 To the extent that some of those in the $50,000 to $200,000 AGI class did experience tax
rate increases that reduced their 1993 taxable incomes below what they would otherwise
have been, our method of comparing the changes in taxable incomes in the two groups
underestimates the effect of the tax rate rise on taxable income. But as noted earlier, on the
basis of the 1991 data, we estimate that only 2 percent of taxpayers in the $50,000 to
$200,000 AGI class in 1993 would have been subject to higher marginal tax rates.
We also developed an estimate of the baseline no-behavioral-response taxable incomes ofEffect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases97
cate that the ATIs of taxpayers with 1993 ACIs of $50,000 to $200,000 was
8.2 percent greater than that of taxpayers with 1992 AGIs of $50,000 to
$200,000. This of course does not imply that on average each individual's
taxable income rose by 8.2 percent, since the general rise in incomes
shifted more taxpayers into the $50,000 to $200,000 ACT class. The
TAXSIM data on individual tax returns imply that this 8.2 percent in-
crease in the total income of the $50,000 to $200,000 ACT class occurs if all
individual taxable incomes grow by 3.4 percent between 1992 and 1993.18
This substantial difference shows the danger of trying to base compari-
Sons across years or across income groups on published data by ACT
class without using microeconomic data to adjust for the changing com-
position of the groups.
Having derived this key 3.4 percent individual income growth parame-
ter, we raise the 1992 ATI of every taxpayer by this amount. With this
growth of ATT at the individual level, the aggregate ATI among taxpayers
with 1993 ACTs over $200,000 would have been $399 billion, an increase of
7.0 percent from the $374 billion in the same ACT class in 1992.
In contrast, the published estimate of ATI among taxpayers with ACTs
over $200,000 in 1993 actually declined from $374 billion in 1992 to $364
billion in 1993.19,20 If the study referred to in the New York Times story had
divided taxpayers at $200,000 of AGIs (to focus on those who were likely
to have experienced high rates), the analysis would have concluded that
those with incomes over $200,000 experienced an aggregate decrease of
taxable incomes of $3 billion, whereas the taxable incomes of those in
lower ACT groups saw their incomes rise by $60 billion.21
Part of the observed decline was due to the fact that some taxpayers
who had taxable incomes over $200,000 in 1992 dropped into the next
the 1993 high-income taxpayers by assuming that their taxable incomes would rise at the
same rate as all taxpayers with AGIs below $200,000. Although this procedure is inferior in
principle to using the taxpayer with AGIs between $50,000 and $200,000 because the lower
income groups are potentially subject to quite different market forces and income composi-
tion than the group of taxpayers with incomes between $50,000 and $200,000, the results for
this "full-sample group" are very similar to the results for the $50,000 to $200,000 group.
18We also rescale the sampling weights to reflect a 1.1 percent increase in the adult
population between 1992 and 1993.
19Such a reduction is very unusual. In the preceding decade, taxable income excluding
capital gains among taxpayers with AGI over $200,000 declined only in 1988 and 1991. The
1991 decline may reflect the increase in the top tax rate that year.
20The 1993 adjusted taxable income among taxpayers with AGIs over $200,000 is derived
from the total taxable income of $427 billion in this group by subtracting $64 billion of
capital gains and adding back in $0.3 billion of standard deductions and $1.5 billion of
personal exemptions.
21Recall that by looking at AGIs over $100,000, they were able to write that the taxes paid
by high-income taxpayers rose $16 billion, whereas the taxable incomes of all others rose
only $3 billion. The $3 billion increase refers to full taxable incomes, not just the ATI.98Feldstein & Feenberg
lower AGI class in 1993 as part of their reaction to the higher marginal
tax rates.It would of course be inappropriate to compare the no-
behavioral-response incomes of those who are projected to have 1993
income over $200,000 to the actual incomes of those with more than
$200,000 of AGI without taking into account the taxpayers who migrated
to the lower AGI class.
To adjust for this shift in taxpayers, we note that, with the no-
behavioral-response assumption, the number of taxpayers with an AGI
greater than $200,000 is projected to increase by 80,000 between 1992 and
1993. In contrast, the observed number of taxpayers with AGIs over
$200,000 actually increased by only 38,000. We infer that 42,000 taxpay-
ers dropped from the ACT greater than $200,000 class to the lower class.
We therefore augment the estimated ATI in the ACT greater than
$200,000 class by an estimate of the taxable income of these 42,000 re-
turns. To be conservative, we attribute to these 42,000 taxpayers an
average "actual" adjusted taxable income equal to the projected average
ATI among 1993 taxpayers with projected no-behavioral-response ACTs
between $200,000 and $220,000. This average is $157,000 per return, or a
total of $6.6 billion. We add this to the $364 billion of ATI among taxpay-
ers with observed ACTs over $200,000 in 1993 to have a figure of $370
billion of ATI that can be compared with our no-behavioral-response
estimate of $399 billion.
4. TAXPAYER RESPONSES AND THE NET REVENUE
EFFECTS OF THE 1993 TAX RATE INCREASES
The analysis of Section 3 provides the key estimates that we need to
evaluate the effect of the taxpayers' behavior in response to the 1993 tax
rate increase. Our analysis implies that if taxpayers had not changed
their behavior in response to the higher marginal tax rates, those taxpay-
ers with 1993 ACTs over $200,000 would have reported total ATI (exclud-
ing capital gains) of $399 billion, whereas the actual total ATI was $370
billion, a decline of $29 billion, or 7.3 percent.
Consider how this decline in ATI affected tax revenue. Our TAXSIM
analysis implies that raising tax rates from 31 to 36 and 39.6 percent
would have increased the 1993 tax paid by high-income taxpayers by
$19.3 billion if the no-behavioral-response level of ATI ($399 billion) had
occurred.In contrast, with the actual modified taxable income reduced
This is quite consistent with the original Treasury estimates. Gerald Auten and Robert
Carroll of the Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis published the Treasury's estimate of the
increase in tax liabilities (Auten and Carroll, 1995). They report a static estimate of $19.5
billion and an estimated net of the long-run behavioral response that is 7 percent less.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases99
to $370 billion, the personal income tax revenue raised with the 1993 tax
rates is only $8.8 billion. This implies that taxpayer responses reduced
the increase in personal income tax revenue by $10.7 billion. This $10.7
billion revenue leakage due to taxpayer responses was equal to 55 per-
cent of the "static" (no behavioral response) projected revenue gain. In
short, the observed experience in 1993 suggests that taxpayer responses
reduced the increase in the personal income tax revenue caused by the
1993 tax rate changes to less than one half of what it would have been
with no behavioral response.
In addition to this loss of personal tax revenue because of the reduc-
tion in taxable incomes, there was also a reduction in high-income and
OASDI and HI payroll tax revenues.The $29 billion reduction in tax-
able income corresponds to a reduction of $1.5 billion of income subject
to the full 15.3 percent OASDI and HI rate and to $5.6 billion of compen-
sation subject to the 0.029 percent HI tax. The implied loss of payroll tax
revenue is thus $0.38 billion.
Combining the personal tax increases and the losses of OASDI and HI
payroll tax revenue implies that the 1993 personal income tax rate
changes raised revenue of only $8.4 billion. In comparison to the "static"
no-behavioral-response projection of $19.3 billion of additional revenue,
this implies a revenue leakage of 57 percent.
5. UNCOMPENSATED AND COMPENSATED
ELASTICITIES IMPLIED BY THE 1993 EXPERIENCE
To calculate the compensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to
the net of tax rate, we begin with the uncompensated elasticity implied
by the evidence in Section 4. We derive this number as the ratio of the
percent change in taxable income to the weighted average percent
change in the marginal net of tax rates.
The $29 billion reduction in taxable income represents a 7.3 percent
decline in taxable income. The percent change in the net of tax rate varies
with the type of income and the individual's initial tax level. The lowest
percent decreases in the net of tax rate relates to taxpayers with taxable
incomes between $140,000 and $250,000 whose compensation exceeded
the 1993 threshold for the HI tax of $135,000. For such taxpayers, the
marginal tax rate was initially 31 percent, implying a marginal net of tax
23Recall that the increase in the tax base for the Hospital Insurance payroll tax did not begin
until 1994. The calculations reported at this point in the paper therefore refer to the loss of
Hospital Insurance and OASDI and Hospital Insurance revenue caused by the reductions in
taxable compensation in response to the higher personal income tax rates. The specific effect
of the 1994 rise in the Hospital Insurance tax base is discussed later in Section 7.100Feldstein & Feenberg
share of 0.69. The rise in the tax rate to 36 percent implies a percent
decline in the net of tax share of 0.05/0.69 = 0.072. The same percent
decline applies also to noncompensation income on tax returns with
taxable income under $250,000. The largest percent decline in the net of
tax share applies to the small amount of wage income that was below the
$57,600 ceiling of the OASDI and HI tax base but is on a tax return with
total taxable income over $250,000. For such income, the initial marginal
tax rate is (0.31 + 0.153)1(1.077) = 0.43 so that the initial net of tax share
is 0.57. The increase in the marginal income tax rate to 0.396 implies a
decline in the net of tax share to 1 - (0.396 + 0.153)11.077 = 0.49, a
decline of 14 percent. Making a similar calculation for each of the six
possible income groups24 and taking the weighted average (using the
amount of income of that type as the weight) produces an average de-
cline in the net of tax share of 11 percent. Thus, the uncompensated
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share isj =
0.073/0.11 = 0.66.
This calculation is effectively a difference-in-difference estimator, us-
ing the difference between the taxable income changes in 1993 and 1992
for the $50,000$200,000 AGI class and the $200,000-plus AGI class.
The Compensated Elasticity
The uncompensated elasticity is less than the compensated elasticity that
is needed to calculate the deadweight loss of the increased tax rates. The
loss of net income caused by the higher tax rates induces taxpayers to
work more, make fewer tax-deductible expenditures (e.g., charitable
contributions), and take more income in cash rather than untaxed fringe
benefits (e.g., attractive offices). This income effect causes the observed
uncompensated decline in taxable income to be less than the compen-
sated effect that would occur if there were no loss of net income.
Because the notion of a compensated elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net of tax rate is not a traditional concept,25 some discus-
sion is warranted. It is useful to begin with the traditional deadweight
loss analysis that assumes that taxes distort only the supply of labor. The
change in labor supply induced by a change in the net wage can be
decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect:
dLld(1 - t)w = {dLId(1 - t)w}COMP + (dL/dy) dy/d(1 - t)w, (1)
24 For each of the two possible increases in the marginal personal income tax rate (0.05 and
0.086), there are three groups defined by the associated payroll tax rate: wages below
$57,600; wages between $57,600 and $135,000; all other wage and nonwage income.
This elasticity is introduced and discussed at length in Feldstein (1995c) on which this
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where w is the wage rate; L is leisure (and 1 - L is total hours worked);
is the proportional tax rate; and dy is the rise in income that results from
the tax rate reduction with no behavioral response. To obtain the corre-
sponding uncompensated and compensated elasticities of labor supply,
substitute 1 - L for L in each of the three derivatives of equation (1),
multiply both sides by (1 - t)I(1 - L). Note that dyld(1 - t) = - dyldt =
w(1 - L), and write 7L for the uncompensated elasticity on the left-hand
side andLfor the compensated elasticity (the first term on the right-
hand side):
= L + (1 - t)w d(1 - L)Idy. (2)
If tax-induced changes in labor supply are the only source of deadweight
loss, the increase in the deadweight loss (DWL) caused by an increase in
marginal tax rates is given by
4DWL = O.5LE(t22 - t12)!(1 - t1)]w(1 - L). (3)
This traditional deadweight loss analysis ignores the effect of changes
in the tax rate on the taxpayers' use of deductions and on the shift of
compensation to excludable forms (fringe benefits, work environment,
etc.). As shown in Feldstein (1995c), the more comprehensive dead-
weight loss that takes into account deductions and exclusions as well as
the laborleisure substitution can be written in the same form as equa-
tion (3) but with the labor supply elasticity replaced by the compensated
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate and with
labor income [w(1 - L)} replaced by taxable income (TI):
4DWL = O.5TI[(t22 - t12)/(1 - t1)]TI. (4)
The compensated elasticity of taxable income can be derived from the
uncompensated elasticity that we have estimated here by a decomposi-
tion similar to equation (1):
dTIId(1 - t) = {dTI/d(1 - t)}COMP + (dTIIdy)[dyld(1 - (5)
or, in elasticity form,
17T1 = TI + (1 - t)[dtald(1 - t)](dTIIdy). (6)
where dta is the change in the average tax rate (ta) on taxable income.
Since we have an estimate of 7)T1 = 0.66, we can estimate TJ by calculat-102Feldstein & Feenberg
ing the value of (1 - t)[dtald(l - t)](dTIIdy). Consider first the value of
dTJJdy, the change in ATI that would result from an incremental dollar of
exogenous income. An increase in exogenous income induces individu-
als to increase their consumption of leisure (wL), to spend more on tax
deductible items like charitable giving (D), and to take more of their
potential compensation in the form of fringe benefits and favorable work-
ing conditions, which are excluded from the definition of taxable income
(E). Thus, dTIIdy = - dwLldy - dD/dy - dEldy. The first of these terms is
the traditional income effect on the demand for leisure. The labor supply
literature suggests that dwLldy is approximately 0.10 to 0.15.26
In an earlier paper, Feldstein (1995c) estimated the effect of an increase
in exogenous income on deductible consumption (dDldy) by a regression
analysis of itemized deductions on AGI (using the TAXSIM model with
individual tax return data for 1991) holding the marginal rate constant.27
To focus on those itemized deductions that represent deductible con-
sumption,28 the measure of deductions used in the regression analyses
excludes income taxes paid to state and local governments and nonmort-
gage interest deductions. Among taxpayers in 1991 in the highest mar-
ginal tax bracket (with first dollar marginal tax rates before deductions of
31 percent), the change in deductibles per dollar of AGI was 7.1 cents.
We can think of no good way to estimate the effect of exogenous
income on the amount of excluded compensation (dE/dy). A large part of
excluded compensation is health benefits, and these are relatively insen-
sitive to income, especially among the very high income taxpayers. Pen-
sion funds vary with wages and salaries but are not likely to be affected
by the receipt of an exogenous lump-sum income. Other forms of exclud-
able income, including the quality of the work environment, are likely to
be more sensitive. We follow Feldstein (1995c) and assign a value of 0.15
to dE/dy.
Combining the three components of dTI = - dwLldy - dDldy - dE/dy
implies that dTI/dy = 0.37. Our data do not allow us to assign different
values of dTI/dy to different groups of taxpayers, and any attempt to do
so would suggest more information than we have. We therefore use dTI/
dy = 0.37 for all taxpayers.
26The estimated income effect in the labor supply literature is based on the response of
participation rates and hours worked. This omits the long-run effect on such things as
career choice and location. The restricted definition of labor supply causes the estimated
compensated elasticity to be an underestimate of the true long-term response.
27This discussion of dTIIdy draws heavily on Feldstein (1995c).
28Only those deductions that represent consumption are relevant for calculating the dead-
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The other terms in equation (6), (1 - t)[dta/d(l - t)], do differ among
taxpayers according to the taxpayer's initial level of taxable income (i.e.,
the level of income with no behavioral response). The net of tax rate (1 - t)
equals 0.69, except on income that is subject at the margin to the social
security and Hospital Insurance payroll taxes. Thus, noncompensation
income and compensation income above $135,000 have a net of tax rate of
0.69. Compensation that is subject to the 2.9 percent employeremployee
rate but not the social security (OASDI and HI) tax (i.e., compensation
between $57,600 and $135,000) have an initial marginal tax rate of (0.31 +
0.029)/(1.0145) = 0.334, where the denominator of this fraction reflects the
employer's share of the payroll tax, implying a net of tax rate of 0.666.
Similarly, for those with incomes below $57,600 who were subject to the
full 15.3 percent payroll tax, the initial marginal tax rate was (0.31 + 0.153)!
(1.077) = 0.430, implying a net of tax rate of 0.570.
Consider next the value of dta/d(1 - t), the ratio of the change in the
average tax rate to the change in the marginal tax rate. For an individual
with taxable income at exactly $140,000, the 1993 tax rates increased the
marginal tax rate from 0.31 to 0.36 but left the tax liability and therefore
the average tax rate unchanged. For such an individual, dta!d(1 - t) = 0,
and there is no income effect. At incomes between $140,000 and
$250,000, the average tax rate increases by 0.05 times the ratio of the
taxable income above $140,000 to total taxable income. In this range,
therefore, dta/d(1 - t) is equal to the ratio of taxable income above
$140,000 to total taxable income. At a taxable income of $250,000 the
marginal tax rate jumps from 36 to 39.6 percent, temporarily reducing
dta!d(1 - t). After that, the ratio rises again toward a limiting value of 1.0.
We calculated the value of (1 - t)[dta/d(1 - t)} for each taxpayer,
multiplied that amount by dTI/dy = 0.37, and added the estimate of
the uncompensated elasticityj = 0.66 to obtain an estimate of the
compensated elasticity for that taxpayer. The weighted average of these
compensated elasticities, weighting by the projected 1993 ATI for that
individual, is= 0.74.
This weighted-average compensated elasticity for high-income tax-
payers implied by the 1993 experience seems quite consistent with the
compensated elasticity found by Feldstein (1995a) and by Auten and
Carroll (1994) on the basis of the experience of a large panel of taxpay-
ers before and after the 1986 tax cuts. The estimate preferred by Feld-
stein was 1.04, whereas the AutenCarroll estimate was 1.33. The
lower value of the current estimate of 0.74 may reflect the short-run
nature of the observation for 1993, since the observed behavior refers to
the same year in which the tax rate was changed. We return to this
issue in Section 7.104Feldstein & Feenberg
THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF THE 1993 INCREASE
IN PERSONAL TAX RATES
The compensated elasticitiescalculated for each type of income of
each taxpayer according to equation (6) can be used to estimate the
deadweight loss for that taxpayer of increasing the marginal personal
income tax rates from 31 to 36 and 39.6 percent. In this calculation, the
marginal tax rate also includes the marginal payroll tax rate (if any).29 For
example, an individual with taxable compensation between $57,600 and
$135,000 who is part of a taxpaying unit with total taxable income be-
tween $140,000 and $250,000 experiences a marginal tax rate increase on
that income from (0.31 + 0.029)/(1.0145) = 0.334 to (0.36 + 0.029)!
(1.0145) = 0.383.
When the increased deadweight losses are aggregated over all the
individuals we obtain a total increase in the deadweight loss due to the
1993 increase in personal income tax rates of $15.9 billion.30 This esti-
mated increase in deadweight loss is thus nearly twice the estimated
increase in tax revenue. Stated differently, for every dollar that the gov-
ernment collects as a result of the increase in the top personal income tax
rates, the taxpayers incur a total cost of nearly $3the dollar transferred
to the government plus the deadweight loss of nearly $2.
The structure of the 1993 tax increase thus made it a very inefficient
way of increasing revenue.
THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASE ON THE
HOSPITAL INSURANCE (HI) TAX BASE
Although elimination of the $135,000 ceiling on the HI tax base was
enacted at the same time as the increase in personal income tax rates, it
only took effect in January 1994. Our evidence therefore does not relate
29We use the expression in equation (4) to calculate the increased deadweight loss due to
the change in the tax on each particular type of income. As noted earlier, we make no
allowance for cross-price effects. We calculate each deadweight loss separately and then
add them.
3°Of this $15.9 billion, more than 70 percent ($11.4 billion) is associated with the increase
from 31 to 39.6 percent. Of this $11.4 billion, very little involves marginal payroll tax rates;
$6.4 billion is associated with compensation over $135,000, and $3.7 billion is associated
with noncompensation income. In contrast, of the $3.9 billion increase in the deadweight
loss associated with the rise in the marginal tax rate from 31 to 36 percent, $3.0 billion is
associated with income that is subject to a marginal payroll tax rate at 2.9 percent ($2.2
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to the effect of that part of the tax increase.3' We can, however, use our
estimated elasticities to calculate the likely effect of the increased HI tax
on tax revenue and on the deadweight loss.
Consider first the ways in which eliminating the ceiling on the HI tax
base changes total tax revenue. Because the higher marginal tax rate
causes a decline in taxable income, the additional HI tax is less than the
amount that would have been collected if there were no behavioral re-
sponse. More important, however, the decline in taxable income also
reduces the income subject to the personal income tax and therefore
reduces the personal income tax revenue.
These effects can be illustrated with the example of an individual
who, with the behavior induced by the 1993 marginal tax rates, would
have taxable income of $220,000 in 1993 and taxable compensation of
$200,000.32 Under the 1993 tax rules, that individual faced a marginal
personal income tax rate of 36 percent and no marginal payroll tax.
Under the 1994 tax rules, the individual would also face a combined
employeremployee payroll tax of 2.9 percent, implying that the tax as
a percentage of the individual's marginal product rises from 0.36 to
0.3897(1.0145) = 0.383. The net of tax rate thus falls from 0.64 to 0.617, a
decline of 3.6 percent. The estimated uncompensated elasticity of j =
0.66 implies that the individual's taxable income declines by 2.4 per-
cent, from $220,000 to $214,720. If the compensation portion declines in
the same proportion, taxable compensation falls from $200,000 to
$195,200. The additional HI tax is 2.9 percent of the difference between
$195,200 and $135,000, or $1,745. But the induced decline in taxable
income of $5,280 (from $220,000 to $214,720) reduces personal tax collec-
tions at a 36 percent rate (i.e., by $1,901). For this taxpayer, the increase
in the HI tax base actually reduces total tax payments by $156.
At higher incomes, the extra payroll tax can outweigh the loss of
personal tax revenue. Consider, for example, a taxpayer with a taxable
income of $330,000 and taxable compensation of $300,000. Under the
1993 tax rules, that individual faced a marginal personal income tax rate
of 39.6 percent and no marginal payroll tax rate. Under the 1994 tax
rules, the individual would also face a combined employeremployee
payroll tax of 2.9 percent, implying that the tax as a percentage of the
31As previously noted, our analysis ignored the fact that taxpayers who were aware that
the HI tax would increase in 1994 had an incentive to advance income into 1993. This
causes us to underestimate the uncompensated and compensated elasticities.
32The difference between taxable income and taxable compensation is the difference be-
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individual's marginal product rises from 0.396 to 0.425/(1.0145) = 0.419.
The net of tax rate thus falls from 0.604 to 0.581, a decline of 3.8 percent.
The estimated uncompensated elasticity of ?J = 0.66 implies that the
individual's taxable income declines by 2.51 percent, from $330,000 to
$324,720. If the compensation portion declines in the same proportion,
taxable compensation falls from $300,000 to $292,470. The additional HI
tax is 2.9 percent of the difference between $292,470 and $135,000, or
$4,566. But the induced decline in taxable income of $8,280 (from
$330,000 to $321,720) reduces personal tax collections at a 39.6 percent
rate (i.e., by $3,278). For this taxpayer, the increase in the HI tax in-
creases total tax collection by only $1,288, or only 27 percent of the static
revenue estimate of 2.9 percent of the $165,000 increased tax base at the
initial level of compensation.
In the aggregate, we estimate that eliminating the $135,000 ceiling on
the HI tax base reduced the predicted revenue (at 1993 income levels)
from $2.1 billion with no behavioral response to only $600 million if
taxpayers reduced their compensation (i.e., total wage and salary income
plus schedule C income) in the same proportion that the 1993 experience
implied for total taxable income. Only when the data for 1994 become
available will it be possible to calculate the actual 1994 revenue response.
The Deadweight Loss of the Increased Hospital Insurance (HI)
Tax Base
Consider next the deadweight loss caused by raising the level of income
subject to the HI tax. There is of course no change in the deadweight loss
for those categories of income that experience no change in the HI tax.
This includes the compensation earned by individuals with compensa-
tion under $135,000 as well as all nonlabor income.33 The deadweight
loss needs to be evaluated only for individuals with taxable compensa-
tion over $135,000. There are two cases within this group: those with
1993 marginal tax rates of 36 percent and those with 1993 marginal tax
rates of 39.6 percent. For each taxpayer, we evaluate the change in
deadweight loss if the tax rate on compensation increases from 0.36 to
0.389/1.0145 = 0.383 or, for higher income taxpayers, from 0.396 to 0.425/
1.0145 = 0.419.
The two cases discussed earlier in this section illustrate the nature of
the calculation. For the taxpayer with $220,000 of taxable income and
$200,000 of taxable compensation at 1993 rates, only the $200,000 is
In calculating the deadweight loss of the increased tax on compensation, we ignore any
possible compensated cross-price effects and therefore look only at the effect of the in-
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relevant for evaluating the deadweight loss of the increase in the HI
ceiling. Equation (4) implies that the increased deadweight loss for this
individual is
4DWL = 0.5{[( 0.383)2 - (0.360)2]/[1 - O.360]}200,000
= 2'680TLI' (7)
where ETLI is the elasticity of taxable labor income to the net of tax rate for
such compensation.
The value of ETLI is not likely to be the same as the taxable income
elasticity ETI because changes in the payroll tax rate do not provide any
incentive to change deductions. To evaluate ETLI it is useful to consider
first the corresponding uncompensated elasticity of taxable labor income
with respect to the corresponding net of tax rate. The elasticity of overall
taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate (ij = 0.66) reflects the
effect of the tax on labor supply, on the form of labor compensation
(fringe benefits and working conditions versus cash) and on the use of
deductibles. The elasticity of taxable compensation, which we label7JTLI'
includes the first two of these but does not include the use of deduct-
ibles. It also includes an additional component: the substitution between
taxable labor income and other forms of income. The 2.9 percent payroll
tax gives individuals an incentive to shift income from taxable compensa-
tion to investment income. Although such a substitution may not be
possible for most taxpayers, high-income individuals that are our focus
here may be able to shift the form of compensation from labor income to
rent, royalties, stock options, capital gains, etc. It is difficult to know the
magnitude of this compensationnoncompensation substitution relative
to the effect of the income tax on the use of itemized deductions. The
difference may cause either a rise or a fall in going from the elasticity of
taxable income to the elasticity of taxable labor income. To be very con-
servative, we shall set iTLl = 0.50, approximately two thirds of the esti-
mated elasticity of taxable income. We recognize that this is only an
educated guess, but we think it is likely to be a conservative one.
The same analysis of income and substitution effects that led to equa-
tion (6) implies that
1)TLI = TLI + (1 - t)[dta/d(l - t)](dTLIIdy). (8)
For the individual with taxable compensation of $220,000 and taxable
labor income of $200,000, the initial marginal tax rate is 36 percent,
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rate above the $135,000 threshold, the ratio dtald(1 - t) is the ratio of the
newly taxable compensation (in this case, $200,000 - $135,000 =
$65,000) to total compensation: (dtald(1 - t) = 0.325. The value of dTLIIdy
is the effect on taxable labor income of an increase in exogenous income.
Omitting the decline in deductible expenditures (dDldy that represented
0.071 of the estimated value of dTIIdy = 0.37) leaves the effect of
exogenous income on the consumption of leisure and on the use of
excludable income like fringe benefits. Unlike the substitution effect,
there is no reason why an exogenous income increase should induce a
change from taxable labor income to nonlabor income. We therefore take
dTLIIdy = 0.30.
Substituting these estimates into equation (8) implies TLI =JTLI +
0.66(0.325)(0.30) = + 0.06 = 0.56. Equation (7) implies that the dead-
weight loss of the HI increase for this taxpayer is $1,501. Thus, the
government collects $316 less in revenue with than without the higher
HI tax but imposes a deadweight loss of $1,501.
Consider next the example of the higher compensation taxpayer with
$300,000. The deadweight loss is based on increasing the marginal tax
rate from 0.396 to 0.419:
LIDWL = 0.5 {[(0.4l9)2 - (0.396)21/(1 - 0.396)}300,000
= (9)
In this case, equation (8) implies that= 0.60. The deadweight loss is
therefore $2,799 whereas the increase in revenue is only $966. The total
burden is thus nearly four times as much as the revenue raised.
We have calculated the increased deadweight loss for each of the
affected taxpayers. The aggregate amount of the deadweight loss is $2.1
billion or more than three times the $600 million net revenue gain from
eliminating the ceiling on the HI tax base.
8. POTENTIAL BIASES IN THE ESTIMATED
TAXPAYER RESPONSE
In interpreting these results and comparing them with the earlier studies
of the effects of the tax rate reductions in the 1980s, several potential
sources of statistical bias should be borne in mind. Some of these cause
our estimates to overstate the true long-term effect of the change in tax
rates, whereas others cause our estimates to understate that true effect.
This section discusses those biases and the future research that may help
to resolve the resulting uncertainty as better data become available.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases109
8.1 Short-Run Response
First, the current analysis refers to the changes in taxpayer behavior
during the same year that Congress enacted the change in tax rates.
Because it takes time for taxpayers to alter their behavior in response to
the higher tax rates, our estimated first-year response may understate
the longer term effect of the tax rate increases.This longer term effect
might, for example, involve changing jobs or employers, resulting in a
more pleasant life-style but lower cash income. If this type of change is
more pronounced among younger individuals who are still making
career choices, it will affect the population as a whole only gradually.
Similarly, older individuals may respond to the higher tax rates by
advancing the date of their retirement or by choosing a mix of more
retirement and less work. Again, it takes time before such decisions,
made in a relatively narrow range of years, come to have a significant
effect on the activity of a large segment of the labor force. All of these
considerations suggest that the long-run effect will be greater than the
short-run effect that has been observed in the present study. A similar
difference may also apply to changes in deductions (e.g., the size of a
mortgage or the purchase of a second home) and in exclusions (the
employer's provision of more fringe benefits instead of larger increases
in cash salaries.)
The observed same-year effect for 1993 may have been depressed
further relative to the potential long-term effect by the fact that the
legislation was not enacted until August of that year. Although the tax
rate increases for high-income individuals were enacted as proposed in
February 1993, other aspects of the President's tax plan were radically
changed. Many taxpayers may therefore have waited until after August
to begin changing their behavior.
In contrast to the current paper, the earlier studies of the effects of
lower tax rates generally were based on taxpayer behavior two years or
more after the tax cut. It is not surprising, therefore, that the estimated
elasticities in the current study are substantially less than the elasticities
estimated for the 1981 and 1986 tax rate reductions.
We will be able to remedy this problem when we have data for a
longer period of time after 1993. For the reasons discussed later in this
section, panel data through 1995 will be particularly valuable in estimat-
ing the longer-term response.
The Treasury Department's estimates assume that the behavioral responses in the nar-
rQw range of changes that they consider do increase from a 7 percent revenue loss in the
first year to a long-run behavioral response that reduces revenue by 16 percent in year 5
and beyond (see Auten and Carroll, 1994b).110Feldstein & Feenberg
8.2 Shifting of Income from 1993 to 1992
A second potential source of statistical bias could result from shifts of
bonuses and other income from 1993 to 1992. Taxpayers who anticipated
the 1993 tax increase may have taken steps to shift income from 1993 to
1992. The Treasury Department, in commenting on an earlier draft of our
study, pointed to a Department of Commerce estimate that $20 billion of
wage and salary income (including bonuses) was shifted from the first
quarter of 1993 to the final quarter of 1992 and argued that our statistical
estimate of a $29 billion loss of taxable income could be explained by such
a one-time shift on the assumption that virtually all the income shifting
was among taxpayers with an ACT greater than $200,000.
It is important to recognize, however, that because of our difference-
in-difference method of estimation, a shift of income from 1993 to 1992
only biases our estimate of the tax-induced change in taxable income in
this way if the intertemporal shift of income is a larger share of taxable
income among the taxpayers in the $200,000-plus AGI group than
among taxpayers in the $50,000 to $200,000 reference group. There is
unfortunately no evidence on the distribution of income shifting. More-
over, wage and salary income constitutes only about two thirds of total
taxable income among the top group but is actually equal to about 120
percent of taxable income among those in the reference group (because
their adjustments and deductions exceed their nonwage incomes.) This
implies that an intertemporal shift of income that was the same fraction
of wages in the two groups would cause the rise in taxable income
among the high-income group to be substantially greater than among
the reference group. In that case, the income shifting would cause our
difference-in-difference procedure to underestimate the true effect of the
higher tax rates. Indeed, unless the relative wage shift was at least 80
percent higher among the top ACT group than among the reference
group, the shifting would cause our estimate to understate the true
effect of higher tax rates.
Although the top income group had a greater incentive to shift in-
comes, many in the reference group believed that they also had reason
to shift income. As the 1994 Economic Report of the President notes, as late
as July 1993 over 70 percent of respondents to a Wall Street Journal/NBC
poll thought that middle-class taxpayers would bear most of the tax
increases (p. 74).
There is of course some doubt about the accuracy of the estimated $20
billion of aggregate shifting. The $20 billion shift of wage and salary
income from the first quarter of 1993 to the final quarter of 1992 is
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less disbursements." This is the only time (at least in the past 25 years for
which we have data) in which the Commerce Department estimates a
wage accruals less disbursements in excess of $1 billion. The staff of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explain in the August 1993 Survey of
Current Business (p. 28) that the method of estimating annual wage and
salary accruals was changed for 1992 to reflect the possibility of a large
amount of bonuses paid in 1992. This change was made because in early
1993, "reports indicated that bonus payments earned by many employ-
ees in the securities industry in 1992 that typically would have been paid
in early 1993 had instead been paid in late 1992." The BEA initially
estimated that $1.5 billion in bonus payments had been accelerated from
1993 to 1992. Later, on the basis of a comparison of the quarterly unem-
ployment insurance reports of covered wages for the fourth quarter of
1992 with the corresponding fourth-quarter reports for the prior years
back to 1982, the BEA revised its estimate and "concluded that about $20
billion" of fourth-quarter 1992 wage and salary income represented an
acceleration of bonus payments from early 1993. This assumption was
used by the BEA to estimate that the "wage accruals less disbursements"
figure for the first quarter of 1993 was a negative $20 billion.
Estimating the extent of wage and salary shifting in the fourth quarter
of 1992 is difficult because that quarter saw a quite dramatic surge of
GDP. The rise in nominal GDP jumped from an annual rate of 4.9 per-
cent in the third quarter of 1992 to 8.6 percent in the fourth quarter and
then fell back again to 4.4 percent in the first quarter of 1993. Shifts in the
timing of compensation would not affect these GDP estimates, since any
shift in wage payments would cause a corresponding shift in profits.
Since wage and salary payments are about half of GDP, a 4.9 percent
increase would correspond to about $150 billion, whereas an 8.6 percent
increase would correspond to about $260 billion. Deciding how much of
the observed $125 billion increase in wage disbursements (seasonally
adjusted) between the third and fourth quarters of 1992 was a "shift in
timing" and how much was a result of the economic surge is a very
difficult judgement to make.
We have, however, followed the procedure described by the BEA and
examined the fourth quarter through insurance reports on covered wage
and salary payments from 1982 to 1992. The fourth quarter of 1992
shows a substantial jump in reported wage and salary income, from the
roughly $65 billion increase in the previous two years to a $106 billion
increase in 1992. Again, it is difficult to know how much of this is due to
the fact that nominal GDP rose at 8.6 percent in the fourth quarter of
1992 but at only 2.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 1991 and 0.5 percent
in the fourth quarter of 1990.112Feldstein & Feenberg
We were also encouraged by the Treasury Department to examine the
evidence on the change in income tax withholding between the end of
1992 and the beginning of 1993 that is published in the monthly Treasury
Bulletins. Although the data are available monthly, the number of work-
ing days and the number of pay periods varies from month to month
and year to year. We have therefore examined quarterly data on tax
withholding. Between the fourth quarter of 1992 and the first quarter of
1993, tax withholding fell by $6.2 billion. However, there was an equally
large drop a year later (a $6.2 billion decline in tax withholding between
the final quarter of 1993 and the first quarter of 1994) and a decline that
was almost as large in the previous year (a decline on $4.0billion from
the first quarter of 1991 to the first quarter of 1992). It is hard to conclude
from the Treasury data that anything unusual occurred at the end of
1992.
8.3 Shifting of Income from 1994 to 1993
High-income taxpayers also had an incentive to shift income from 1994
to 1993. To the extent that such shifting occurred and that it was rela-
tively greater than the shifting among those in the $50,000 to $200,000
AGI class, our estimates would understate the effect of the 1993 tax rate
increases.
One reason for the high-income taxpayers to shift income from 1994 to
1993 was to avoid the 2.9 percent payroll tax scheduled to begin in
January 1994. For a taxpayer with a 39.6 percent marginal rate of per-
sonal income tax, eliminating the ceiling on income subject to the HI tax
raised the marginal tax rate to 41.9 percent. The net tax share thus
decreased by 3.8 percent.
There was, moreover, substantial uncertainty even in 1993 about
whether the Administration's proposal would be enacted and, if en-
acted, whether it would be "retroactive" to January 1993. Many high-
income taxpayers hoped that tax rates for 1993 would be increased only
part of the way to the full higher rates that would begin in 1994. Those
who thought that there was some possibility that the rates would be
lower in 1993 than in 1994 had an incentive to advance from future years
to 1993 (e.g., by shifting a bonus from 1994 to 1993 or by ending a
deferred compensation arrangement).
The change in the alternative minimum tax provided another reason
why some taxpayers might have shifted some income from 1994 to 1993.
The AMT raises an individual's overall tax liability by eliminating deduc-
tions and adjustments to income that would be allowed under the ordi-
nary income tax but taxes that greater income at a lower marginal rate
than the ordinary income tax. The current AMT rate is 26 percent. AnEffect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases113
individual who faced the AMT in 1993 but expected to avoid the AMT in
1994 would have an incentive to shift compensation from 1994 to 1993 to
take advantage of the lower overall tax rate.
Although the official estimates of "wage accruals less disbursements"
show no unusual activity at the end of 1993, the underlying evidence
used by the BEA to impute a $20 billion value of "wage accruals less
disbursements" to the final quarter of 1992 suggests an approximately
equally large adjustment for the final quarter of 1993. We have already
noted that the Treasury withholding receipts fell by exactly the same
amount from the end of 1993 to start of 1994 as it did between the end of
1992 and the first quarter of 1993. In addition, the wages covered by
unemployment insurance reported for the fourth quarter of 1993 also
jumped by a large $97 billion (similar to the $106 billion in the final
quarter of 1992) before reverting to $64 billion in the final quarter of 1994,
the same level that had prevailed in the final quarters of 1990 and 1991.
It is impossible to use the currently available tax data itself to sort out
the role of shifting versus sustained taxable changes in taxable income.
Only when panel data through 1995 become available will it be possible
to address this issue in a fully satisfactory way.
8.4 Assuming No Tax Increases in the $50,000 to $200,000 AGI
Reference Group
The difference-in-difference method assumes that the tax rates increased
among those with ACTs greater than $200,000 but that there were no tax
rate increases in the reference group with AGIs between $50,000 and
$200,000. In fact, some taxpayers in this reference group (about 3 percent
overall and 10 percent among those with ACTs between $100,000 and
$200,000) did have incomes high enough to make them subject to the
1993 rise in tax rates. This "contamination" of the reference group means
that the assumed change in tax rates between the two groups is larger
than the actual one. This in turn causes an underestimate of the sensitiv-
ity of taxable income to the rise in tax rates and a corresponding underes-
timate of the implied elasticity.
8.5 Lack of Panel Data
The current study is not based on actual panel data that would allow
following the same individuals through time as tax rates change. Al-
though the earlier studies of the 1986 tax reductions using panel data
were consistent with previous studies using the current type of "syn-
thetic" panel data, the lack of actual panel data does introduce additional
uncertainty in the estimates. The individuals in the highest income
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by the fact that AGI includes capital gains, whereas our focus is on the
taxable income excluding capital gains. Moreover, the reference group is
necessarily defined in terms of nominal income levels rather than real
income levels or equal numbers of taxpayers. We do not see any reason
why this should bias the results but recognize that it does introduce
additional uncertainty that would not be present with panel data.
The problem of comparing groups in different years becomes greater
as the time between the years increases. For that reason, we were reluc-
tant to extend our analysis from the comparison of 1993 and 1992 to
earlier years. We did, however, repeat our analysis using 1991 as a
reference year. More specifically, we used the change in taxable incomes
between 1991 and 1993 in the group with nominal ACTs of $50,000 to
$200,000 as the standard for predicting the rise in taxable incomes among
those with AGIs over $200,000. Unlike the 1992-based comparison, the
1991-based comparison showed no tendency to overestimate the taxable
income of the high-income group. There is no way to know whether this
reflects the statistical biases associated with income shifting, the reduced
comparability of taxpayers in the same AGI groups when we go from
one year to two based on nominal income classification, or the very
strong business cycle recovery that occurred in 1991. Only good panel
data from 1991 through 1995 will be able to provide a fully reliable
answer to this question.
8.6 Assuming a Stable Income Distribution
The difference-in-difference approach implicitly assumes that the rela-
tive rates of increase of taxable incomes would have been the same in the
high-income and reference groups if there had been no change in tax
rates. A substantial amount of evidence suggests that higher incomes are
in fact rising more rapidly. Although some of this may itself be tax
induced, there is substantial evidence that higher incomes are rising
more rapidly than lower incomes for nontax reasons as well.
To the extent that the high-income taxpayers would have had greater
income increases than taxpayers in the reference group in the absence of
a tax change, our difference-in-difference method causes us to underesti-
mate the true effect of the rise in tax rates. It would be desirable to try to
estimate the extent of the likely change in income distribution due to
nontax factors. This, too, will be helped when we have data that extends
to at least 1995, since that eliminates any possible distortions due to
temporary income shifting between 1993 and 1994. It would be desirable
also to analyze this in a way that separates cyclical influence on the
income distribution.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases115
9. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
Several tentative conclusions emerge from this study. First, the basic
estimates suggest that taxpayers reduced their taxable incomes in re-
sponse to the higher 1993 marginal tax rates. Although the reductions
were not absolutely large, they were large enough to imply a loss of
about half of the additional revenue that would have been raised by the
1993 tax rate increases if there had been no behavioral response.
Second, the implied elasticities are somewhat lower than the sensitiv-
ity reported in previous studies of the response to the tax rate decreases
of the 1980s. This may reflect the fact that the current estimates relate to
the taxpayer responses within the same year that the tax rate was en-
acted and that the legislation was enacted only in August of the year.
Third, the estimates imply that the structure of the 1993 tax rate in-
crease resulted in very little net revenue despite the sharp increase in
marginal tax rates. The estimated taxpayer response implies a loss of
more than half of the additional personal income tax revenue that would
have occurred with no behavioral response. The reduction in payroll tax
revenue that resulted from reduced incomes increased the overall leak-
age of tax revenue to 5.7 percent of the static estimate. Instead of raising
$19.3 billion of additional personal income tax revenue, the higher mar-
ginal tax rates led to an estimated revenue increase of only $8.4 billion.
These estimates differ very greatly from the traditional and virtually
"static" revenue estimates used by the Treasury Department and the
Congressional Joint Tax Committee.35
Fourth, the behavioral response implies a compensated elasticity that
is about 0.74. This in turn implies that increasing marginal tax rates from
31 to 36 and 39.6 percent raised the deadweight loss of the personal
income tax by $15.9 billion. Thus, the 1993 personal tax rate increases
raised the deadweight loss by approximately $2 for every additional
dollar of tax revenue.
Finally, we used the estimated response to the higher personal income
tax rates in 1993 to evaluate the effect of the increase in the HI tax base
that took effect in January 1994. The combined employer-employee tax
of 2.9 percent raised payroll tax revenue of about $2.0 billion. But the
higher marginal tax rates that resulted are likely to have caused a decline
in personal income tax revenue of $1.4 billion. The net effect of eliminat-
Recall that the Treasury Department assumed that the revenue loss due to taxpayer
responses would be only 7 percent of the static no-behavioral-response revenue (Auten
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ing the $135,000 ceiling on the HI tax base was therefore to raise total
federal tax revenue by only $600 million.
Several possible statistical biases could cause the estimated effect of
the tax changes to either underestimate or overestimate the true long-
run effects. These were discussed in Section 8. Only further research,
preferably with panel data for a longer period of time, can resolve some
of these uncertainties. But until these additional studies are done, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the higher marginal tax rates in 1993
raised substantially less revenue than a static estimate would imply and
imposed relatively large deadweight losses.
REFERENCES
Auerbach, Alan (1994). "The U.S. Fiscal Problem: Where We Are, How We Got
Here, and Where We're Going." in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Stan-
ley Fischer and Julio Rotemberg (eds.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp.
141-175.
(1995). "Tax Projections and the Budget: Lessons from the 1980s." Ameri-
can Economic Review 85(no. 2, May): 165-169.
Auten, Gerald, and Robert Carroll (1995). "Behavior of the Affluent and the 1986
Tax Reform Act." In Proceedings of the Eighty-Seventh Annual Conference on Taxa-
tion of the National Tax Association, Columbus, Ohio: 70-76.
(1994). "Tax Rates, Taxpayer Behavior and the 1993 Act." In Proceedings of
the Eighty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Tax Association, Columbus,
Ohio: 7-12.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, August, 1993, P. 23.
Council of Economic Advisors, The Economic Report of the President, 1995. Febru-
ary 1995, GPO, Washington, D.C.
Cruciano, Teresa (1995). "Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data,
1993." Statistics of Income Bulletin. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Trea-
sury, Internal Revenue Service, Summer.
Eissa, Nada (1995). "Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 as a Natural Experiment." NBER Working Paper no. 5023,
February.
(1996). "Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Act of 1981." Forth-
coming in Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation, Martin Feldstein and
James Poterba (eds.).
Feenberg, Daniel, and James Poterba (1993). "Income Inequality and the In-
comes of Very High Income Taxpayers." In Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 7,
James Poterba (ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Feldstein, Martin (1994). "The Case for Dynamic Analysis." Wall Street Journal
December 14.
(1995a). "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel
Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 103, no. 3,
pp. 551-572, June.
(1995b). "Behavioral Responses to Tax Rates: Evidence from TRA86."
American Economic Review 85(no. 2, May), pp. 170-174, AEA Papers and
Proceedings.Effect of 1993 Tax Rate Increases117
(1995c). "Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax."
NBER Working Paper no. 5055.
and Daniel Feenberg (1993). "Higher Tax Rates with Little Revenue
Gain: An Empirical Analysis of the Clinton Tax Plan." Tax Notes, vol. 58, no.
12, pp. 1653-1657, March 22.
(1995). "The Taxation of Two Earner Families." NBER Working Paper
no. 5155, June. Forthcoming in Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation,
Martin Feldstein and James Poterba, (eds.).
Lindsey, Lawrence (1987). "Individual Taxpayer Response To Tax Cuts: 1982-
1984, with Implications for the Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate." Journal of
Public Economics 33: 173-206.
Navratil, John (1995). "Essay on the Impact of Marginal Tax Rate Reductions on
the Reporting of Taxable Income on Individual Income Tax Returns." Doctoral
Dissertation, Harvard University.
U.S. Treasury, U.S. Treasury Bulletin, various issues, 1979-1995.